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Review
The levels of analysis revisited
Scott A. MacDougall-Shackleton*
Advanced Facility for Avian Research, Departments of Psychology and Biology, University of Western
Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2
The term levels of analysis has been used in several ways: to distinguish between ultimate and prox-
imate levels, to categorize different kinds of research questions and to differentiate levels of
reductionism. Because questions regarding ultimate function and proximate mechanisms are logi-
cally distinct, I suggest that distinguishing between these two levels is the best use of the term.
Integrating across levels in research has potential risks, but many benefits. Consideration at one
level can help generate novel hypotheses at the other, define categories of behaviour and set criteria
that must be addressed. Taking an adaptationist stance thus strengthens research on proximate
mechanisms. Similarly, it is critical for researchers studying adaptation and function to have detailed
knowledge of proximate mechanisms that may constrain or modulate evolutionary processes.
Despite the benefits of integrating across ultimate and proximate levels, failure to clearly identify
levels of analysis, and whether or not hypotheses are exclusive alternatives, can create false debates.
Such non-alternative hypotheses may occur between or within levels, and are not limited to
integrative approaches. In this review, I survey different uses of the term levels of analysis and the
benefits of integration, and highlight examples of false debate within and between levels. The
best integrative biology reciprocally uses ultimate and proximate hypotheses to generate a more
complete understanding of behaviour.
Keywords: integration; proximate; ultimate; levels of analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
Behaviour is studied from a variety of perspectives,
ranging from social sciences, to behavioural ecology
and animal behaviour, to cellular and molecular
neuroscience. One of the greatest challenges of inte-
grative biology is to synthesize ideas and information
across such approaches to seek a more complete
understanding. Integrative biologists are fortunate in
that there is a rich and deep theoretical framework
that can be used to aid such synthesis across different
approaches. This theoretical framework is, of course,
the grand unifying theory of all biology: evolution by
natural selection.
The challenge of integration thus includes the
challenge of considering evolution and adaptation when
exploring the mechanisms of behaviour, and of consider-
ing mechanisms of behaviour when exploring evolution.
Taking an evolutionary or adaptationist approach when
studying mechanisms and developmental processes of
behaviour has become increasingly popular in fields
including behavioural ecology and evolutionary psychol-
ogy, but has been extensively criticized (e.g. [1–4]). In
this review, I explore the integration of adaptive function
and causal mechanism. Central to this issue is seeking
clarity about levels of analysis and levels of reductionism,
and explicitly considering whether or not potentially
competing hypotheses are, or are not, mutually exclusive.
First, I review varied concepts of the levels of analysis and
attempts to synthesize or integrate between them.
Second, I review several ways in which considering the
ultimate function of behaviour can aid in exploring the
mechanisms of behaviour. Finally, I make the point
that clarity about whether or not competing hypotheses
are mutually exclusive is required to eliminate false
debate between and within levels of analysis. The
examples I use below are biased to include studies on
songbirds, in part because that is my own field of
research, but also because birds are studied extensively
from different perspectives across a range of disciplines
and provide an excellent case study.
2. CAUSE AND FUNCTION
(a) Levels of analysis
Baker [5] distinguished between ultimate and proxi-
mate factors that regulate the timing of reproduction.
Ultimate factors are those variables that determine off-
spring survival and thus reproductive success (e.g.
food availability) and proximate factors are those vari-
ables that organisms actually use to time reproduction
(e.g. the annual change in photoperiod). Mayr [6]
refined and extended the use of these terms to high-
light two kinds of questions biologists can ask about
a phenomenon: ‘what is the proximate causation?’
(causes derived within the life of the organism)
versus ‘what is the ultimate causation?’ (causes derived
over evolutionary time). These two kinds of questions
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have become generally accepted as two levels of analy-
sis. The proximate level (how questions) deals with
mechanistic causes such as genetic, neural, hormonal,
or cognitive/behavioural processes, whereas the ulti-
mate level (why questions) deals with adaptive and
evolutionary aspects. Ultimate ‘causes’ are causes
only in the sense of an Aristotelian Final Cause and
thus the ultimate and proximate levels have been
summarized as function and cause, respectively [7].
In addition to the distinction between ultimate and
proximate levels, the term levels of analysis has been
used in other ways (table 1). A common example
of this in animal behaviour is Tinbergen’s [9] four
questions of evolutionary history, adaptive function,
causation and development. Tinbergen’s framework is,
justifiably, adopted in every major textbook in animal
behaviour, and answers to each of these four kinds of
questions are required for a full understanding of behav-
iour. Some authors, however, have equated these
questions with the levels of analysis, and even proposed
a fifth level for cognitive or psychological mechanisms
(e.g. [8]). The term levels of analysis is additionally some-
times used to refer to levels of reductionism, such as
behavioural, physiological, neural or molecular genetic
levels of inquiry. I would argue that, given the distinct
differences between mechanistic causes and adaptive
functions—that is given they are distinct logical cat-
egories [10,11]—Mayr’s division of ultimate and
proximate levels is the most appropriate use of the term.
Table 1 illustrates that the term levels of analysis has
been used in very different ways. However, it is impor-
tant to note that the reference to levels need not imply
a hierarchy or ranking of importance. Ultimate and
proximate explanations are different explanations,
but—despite claims by some—these two types of ques-
tions are not hierarchically related, and research at one
level is not inherently superior to research at the other
level [10].
Apart from providing theoretical scaffolding by
which to organize different approaches to the study
of behaviour, the levels of analysis are important in
that they clarify non-overlapping explanations and
hypotheses [8]. For example, the statement that
‘male birds sing in spring to attract mates’ is not
mutually exclusive with the statement that ‘male
birds sing in spring due to increased levels of circulat-
ing testosterone’. Of course, both of these hypotheses
could be correct, or both could be incorrect. They
are explanations at different levels of analysis; current
adaptive function (ultimate) and physiological mechan-
ism (proximate). Indeed, much fruitless debate could
be avoided in some fields, such as evolutionary psychol-
ogy, if opponents would acknowledge that both adaptive
function and current socio-economic conditions can
explain variation in human behaviour and that hypoth-
eses at these two levels are not directly competitive.
This issue is explored further in §2b below.
One of the key issues in debates centred on levels of
analysis is whether information from one level of
analysis can inform research at the other. Sherman
[8] notes that non-overlapping explanations occur
even within the proximate or ultimate levels of analy-
sis. For example, hypotheses regarding the current
adaptive utility (trait X is adaptive because of Y ) and
evolutionary history (trait X arose from a non-adaptive
precursor) may be non-competing. I argue that
mutually compatible explanatory hypotheses extend
beyond traditional considerations of levels of analysis
and do not only exist on different levels of analysis. An
example of this is illustrated by the different hypotheses
proposed to explain variation in immediate-early gene
(IEG) expression in the auditory forebrain of songbirds
(below). Whether or not two hypotheses are mutually
exclusive is critical to preventing false debate either
across, or within, levels of analysis.
(b) Non-alternative hypotheses:
immediate-early gene expression in
songbird brains
Measuring the expression of IEGs in the brain has
become a standard method for assessing which neurons
are repeatedly depolarized during exposure to a stimu-
lus. For example, expression of the gene c-fos is
increased in the medial preoptic area and the medial
and cortical amygdala ofmother rats following exposure
to pups [12]. In songbirds, increased expression of the
IEG ZENK (hereafter Zenk response) occurs in audi-
tory forebrain regions including the caudomedial
mesopallium (CMM) and caudomedial nidopallium
(NCM) following exposure to conspecific vocalizations.
CMM and NCM exhibit greater Zenk response
following playback of conspecific song as opposed to
other stimuli [13]. The importance of these brain
regions for auditory processing of song has been
corroborated by electrophysiology [14] and a lesion
study [15]. The amount of Zenk response in the
auditory forebrain has been shown to correlate well
with variation in the nature of the song stimuli.
For example, the Zenk response in the NCM is
positively related to the complexity of playback songs in
budgerigars, Melopsittacus undulatus [16] and the bout
length of playback songs in European starlings, Sturnus
vulgaris [17]. Moreover, in white-crowned sparrows
(Zonotrichia leucophrys), the Zenk response is higher in
birds exposed to preferred local dialect songs, and
Table 1. Three uses of the term levels of analysis. I suggest
that the distinction between ultimate and proximate levels is
the best use of this term, though the other uses are now
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correlates with the number of sexual displays emitted
during song playback [18]. Thus, in a range of species,
the Zenk response in auditory regions appears related
to the biological salience of the song playback.
What accounts for this correlation between the
nature of the song playback and the ensuing Zenk
expression? One explanation is that increased activation
of neurons in NCM and/or CMM reflects the auditory
memories of songs learnt early in life. In support of this,
the Zenk response to song playback is related to the
accuracy of song learning in zebra finches (Taeniopygia
guttata) [19,20]. Moreover, the Zenk response is
higher in NCM and CMM following the playback of
tutor song (compared with novel song) in young zebra
finches in the process of song learning [21]. This differ-
ential Zenk response was absent in HVC (not an
acronym, sometimes referred to as high vocal centre),
a brain region critical for the production of learned
song. Thus, growing evidence links the Zenk response
in these caudal pallial regions with the memory of
learned song that guides song production [22].
A different hypothesis used to explain variation in
the Zenk response is that variation in IEG expression
in the songbird auditory forebrain reflects attention
mechanisms. Kruse et al. [23] found that changing the
playback context increases Zenk expression in response
to the same song.Merely switching the speaker location
resulted in an increased Zenk response compared with
the song playing from the same location. Similarly,
male song sparrows (Melospiza melodia) show increased
Zenk response in NCMwhen they are exposed to novel
territorial songs as compared to when they are exposed
to songs they had previously heard [24]. In female
house finches (Carpodacus mexicanus) and song spar-
rows, there was no differential Zenk expression in
response to playback of tutor versus non-tutor songs;
however, in both species, Zenk expression was higher
in isolate-reared females than in tutored females,
consistent with the idea that the isolates were more
attentive to songs when compared with tutored birds
[25,26]. Combined, the results of the studies above
are consistent with the idea that increased Zenk
expression is related to increased perceptual processing
via some form of attentional gating mechanism.
We thus have at least two testable hypotheses to
explain variation in Zenk expression in the auditory
forebrain. Hypothesis 1 is that increased Zenk
response occurs because NCM and CMM provide
the neural substrate for song memories. This hypoth-
esis may or may not be correct for a number of
reasons. For example, the locus of song memories
may be elsewhere and the patterns of Zenk activation
explained by other factors. Second, there may be no
single locus of the song engram, and different aspects
of song memories may be distributed over a range of
perceptual and motor regions including NCM,
CMM and the song-control regions such as HVC. Dif-
ferentiating among these requires further experiments.
Hypothesis 2 is that increased Zenk response reflects
increased perceptual processing owing to an atten-
tional gating mechanism. Similarly, this hypothesis
may or may not be correct. The patterns described
above are consistent with birds exhibiting variation in
attention to song playback, but could result even in
the absence of attention if, for example, the birds
were asleep (see [21]). The important point is that
these two hypotheses are on the same level of analysis
(proximate) and address the same category of question
(neural and cognitive mechanisms) but are still non-
alternative explanatory hypotheses (sensu [8]). Both
of these hypotheses could be correct in that increased
Zenk could both reflect attentional processes and the
locus of song memory; the two hypotheses are not
mutually exclusive. Of course, future data could also
prove both hypotheses incorrect.
This example highlights the importance of formulat-
ing clear hypotheses and determining whether or not
different hypotheses are truly alternatives. Hypotheses
at different levels of analysis are explicitly non-
alternatives, but so too are many hypotheses within the
same level. Confusion over falsely competing hypotheses is
not limited to hypotheses at different levels of analysis. Some
integrative and adaptationist approaches have been criti-
cized for confusing levels of analysis (discussed in [1,8]).
However, this problem is not limited to fields that
attempt to integrate between proximate and ultimate
levels, and occurs within fields that are exploring the
same mechanisms in the same research domain. Careful
attention needs to be paid to determine whether both
hypotheses are mutually exclusive of each other or not,
regardless of whether one is a causal and one a functional
hypothesis, or both are functional hypotheses.
The example of IEG expression in the auditory
forebrain highlights another point. Both of the above
hypotheses can, and have, been criticized on the
grounds that neither of them explains anything.
Indeed, over the years, I have received several anony-
mous reviews pointing out that because it is unclear
what is occurring at the cellular and molecular level,
these hypotheses are void of mechanism. This category
of comments reflects a failure to distinguish levels of
reductionism (sometimes referred to as levels of analy-
sis, table 1), and an assumption that analyses at
lower levels of reductionism are inherently superior.
Dennett [27] refers to reductionism that values lower
levels and ignores complexities and theory at higher
levels as ‘greedy reductionism’. I refer to the view
that research at lower levels of reductionism is inher-
ently superior or more scientific as ‘reductionist
snobbery’. These views value physics over chemistry,
and chemistry over biology. Greedy reductionism and
reductionist snobbery are also present within biology,
for example, when authors restrict the use of the
work ‘mechanism’ to refer to cellular and molecular
mechanisms and not behavioural or cognitive mechan-
isms, or explicitly value proximate explanations over
ultimate [28]. Mechanisms, broadly speaking, include
causal processes at the proximate level of analysis.
These can include molecular, cellular or system level
processes. The interaction of different organisms,
different brain regions, different neurons, or different
proteins can all be proximate mechanisms.
We do not fully understand how auditory processing
in the songbird auditory forebrain results in increased
expression of Zenk, nor do we know the downstream
target genes in these brain regions and how their regu-
lation affects activity in these brain areas. However,
incomplete understanding at one level of reductionism
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does not negate hypothesis testing at another level.
Studies of cellular and molecular mechanisms, physio-
logical mechanisms, developmental processes, and
indeed cognitive and behavioural mechanisms are all
at the proximate level of analysis.
(c) Cause and function: integrating across
ultimate and proximate levels of analysis
Because explanations at different levels of analysis are
not mutually exclusive alternatives, they cannot
directly compete with each other. Indeed, there is
almost unanimous consensus that we need expla-
nations at both ultimate and proximate levels for a
complete understanding of behaviour [2]. Some
argue for boundaries between levels of analysis in
order to eliminate confusion between them (e.g.
[29]). Hogan [11] further points out that cause
and function are logically distinct categories, and
rejects Mayr’s terminology of ultimate ‘causation’.
Because adaptations are the outcome of selection, it
is teleological to argue that adaptive function can,
in any sense, be an ultimate cause of behaviour.
More to the point, Hogan [11] argues that function
can tell us nothing about proximate causation.
Similarly, Bolhuis [2] argues that, at most, functional
considerations can provide only clues as to potential
mechanisms.
Despite the clear distinction between proximate and
ultimate levels of analysis, however, approaches that
integrate across these levels are thriving. Behavioural
ecology, traditionally focused on ultimate questions,
has become more and more focused on proximate
mechanisms including immunology, endocrinology,
neurobiology and development. Such approaches use
information from the proximate level of analysis to
help formulate and revise hypotheses at the ultimate
level. Indeed, many argue that a failure to integrate
across levels is likely to lead to erroneous interpret-
ations [30], and that data and interpretations drawn
from one level can inform data and interpretations at
the other. McNamara & Houston [31] argue that it
is necessary to integrate mechanisms when exploring
the evolution of behaviour.
Not all agree that integration across levels of analy-
sis is a useful research strategy, however (e.g. [1]), and
suggest that instead research at the proximate level
should focus on naturally occurring behaviours, but
without presuppositions as concerning the evolutionary
or functional significance of them. I disagree. Taking an
adaptationist stance—assuming that neural and cogni-
tive mechanisms have function, and have been
shaped by natural selection—does more than providing
clues as to their mechanisms. Assuming adaptive
function or design (the intentional or adaptationist
stance) is an efficient and sensible way to figure out
how something works [27,32]. In reverse engineering
something, an adaptationist stance (assuming design)
constrains and directs lines of inquiry from vast to
those best suited to the data [27,32]. The discovery
of how the heart acts as a pump, for example, was no
doubt aided by the assumption that the heart has a
(adaptive) function: that of, well, a pump. Similarly,
the study of mechanisms of behaviour can benefit
from the adaptationist stance. A research programme
aimed at understanding mechanisms of behaviour that
truly and entirely ignores function becomes a Brownian
random walk at the proximate level.
It is important to note, however, that an adaptationist
stance does not imply Panglossian hyper-adaptationism
(sensu [33]). Assuming an adaptive function as a way to
develop and test hypotheses is not synonymous with
accepting such hypotheses despite evidence to the
contrary. Particular neural or behavioural mechanisms
cannot be automatically assumed, just because a
behaviour has a particular adaptive function. An
integrative approach uses considerations of function
and evolutionary history to generate hypotheses as
to proximate mechanisms, and then proceeds to test,
and possibly to reject, these hypotheses [34].
Adaptationist integrative biologists use functional
considerations to interpret data and generate hypoth-
eses. Sherry [35,36] highlights several ways that a
consideration of adaptive function can aid in the
study of mechanisms. First, function can provide gui-
dance in developing hypothesis at the proximate level
(§3a). Second, adaptive function can define the cat-
egories of behaviour that are further explored at the
proximate level (§3b). Third, consideration of function
can set criteria that proximate explanations must
satisfy (§3c). In addition to these benefits, an integra-
tive approach has at least one other major strength.
Not only does a consideration of adaptive function
help guide research and interpretation of proximate
mechanisms, but data and interpretations of proximate
mechanisms often reciprocally guide and refine
functional and evolutionary hypotheses (§3d).
3. THE ADAPTATIONIST INTEGRATIVE
APPROACH
(a) Generating hypotheses
The power of the adaptationist stance to generate novel
hypotheses is a major strength of an adaptationist inte-
grative approach, such as neuroecology or behavioural
ecology. Sherry [35] documents several examples
including olfactory learning in rodents resulting in dis-
assortative mating at the major histocompatibility
complex [37] and the use of hippocampus-dependent
spatial memory to retrieve cached food by chickadees
[38,39]. The first of these examples arose fromevolution-
ary theory on inclusive fitness [40], which raises the
proximate question: how do animals recognize their rela-
tives? The second example arose from a functional
consideration that food-storing birds increase overwinter
survival through caching, which raises the question: how
do birds retrieve cached food?
A third example is sex ratio manipulation. Follow-
ing long-standing theory that sex ratios should be
maintained at 1 : 1 [41], Trivers & Willard [42] pre-
dicted that parents should be able to adjust offspring
sex ratio depending on their condition. This differen-
tial sex-allocation theory has been supported by
numerous studies, and there is good evidence that
this can even apply to primary sex ratios in vertebrates.
For example, collared flycatcher (Ficedula albicollis)
females appear able to adjust the sex ratio of eggs ovu-
lated in response to the phenotype of their mate [43].
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This raises the novel proximate question: how do birds
adjust the primary sex ratio of their eggs? Recent evi-
dence suggests that hormone levels of the mother
may play a role. For example, high progesterone
during meiosis can bias sex ratios towards overproduc-
tion of females [44]. Other hormones may affect
primary sex ratios as well, and research is ongoing
(reviewed in [45]). Much study remains to work out
the molecular mechanisms of this remarkable process.
However, it is unlikely that any of these research
groups would have undertaken the detailed and
expensive mechanistic studies to explore how birds
manipulate primary sex ratio without previous evi-
dence that birds do indeed manipulate primary sex
ratio in the wild. These field observations were in
turn motivated by predictions from sex-allocation
theory that assumed adaptive function. Consideration
of adaptive function provides motivation and direction
to explore novel proximate mechanisms.
Of course, consideration of adaptive function some-
times generates proximate hypotheses that are not
supported, or are not good ideas to begin with. For
example, one might predict that since, in many song-
bird species, males learn to sing and females do not,
males might have been selected to be better auditory
learners than females. As noted by Bolhuis &Macphail
[1], there is no evidence for this hypothesis. Of course,
one might also predict the opposite. Since, in many
species, females are the primary receivers of song,
might they be superior to males in auditory perception
or auditory learning? Evidence suggests that this may
be the case in some species. Although data are scant
[46], some evidence indicates that female Bengalese
finches (Lonchuria striata) are more sensitive to
changes in song stimuli than males, as assessed by
changes in heart rate [47]. Similarly, female red-
winged blackbirds (Agelaius phoeniceus) appear to be
more perceptive of songs than are males [48]. Whether
or not a hypothesis about proximate mechanisms that
was derived from evolutionary predictions is supported
by the data, or was a good idea to begin with, is unre-
lated to the fact the hypothesis was based on ideas
from the ultimate level of analysis.
As one further example of the importance of using
information on adaptive function to explore mechan-
ism I return to the issue of which regions in the
songbird brain underlie song perception and auditory
song memory. Much of the early research on the
neural bases of song perception and auditory mem-
ories focused on the song-control system, brain
regions demonstrated to be important for song pro-
duction and acquisition [22]. Current evidence
suggests that this may not be the case, and instead
good candidates for the regions important for percep-
tion and song memories include auditory regions, such
as CMM and NCM. Considering function, however,
directly influenced the discovery that these areas are
important for song perception. For example, the con-
sideration that song functions in female attraction led
to the hypothesis that, because female zebra finches
have a tiny HVC compared with males [49], it would
be unlikely that the song region HVC is important
for song perception. That is, if HVC is critical for
song perception, it should not be so small in female
zebra finches. As may be predicted, HVC lesions did
not disrupt song preferences in female zebra finches,
but CMM lesions did [15]. Earlier work on marsh
wrens (Cistothorus palustris) similarly suggested that
HVCmight not be the primary brain region underlying
song perception and song memories. Males of the wes-
tern subspecies sing more complex songs and have a
larger HVC than males of the eastern subspecies [50].
However, HVC size differences between these subspe-
cies do not reflect song-learning experience [51], nor
are there differences between the subspecies in HVC
size in females [52]. These studies took an adapta-
tionist, integrative approach and assessed whether
variation in HVC size might reflect differences in song
learning or song perception. The results did not support
this idea, and the search for the neural substrates of song
perception continued.
If birds are adapted to process species-specific songs
differently from other sounds, they should possess
brain regions that receive auditory input and respond
specifically to song more strongly than other sounds.
This is exactly what was found with the discovery
of the connectivity of CMM and NCM to other audi-
tory regions and the IEG response of these regions to
song playback [13,53,54]. As noted in §2b, above,
there is growing evidence that these regions are critical
for song perception in many species, and may also
function as the neural basis of song memories. It is
important to note, however, that these neural regions
important for specialized auditory processing of
song, and which may also serve in storing auditory
memories of song, were discovered by considering
clues suggested by adaptive function, not by consider-
ing the behaviour in the absence of presuppositions
concerning their evolutionary or functional signifi-
cance. It is too early to entirely rule out a role for
the song-control brain regions as important for song
perception and memories, as correlations and lesion
data from at least canaries (Serinus canaria) do support
this [55–58]. Further work is clearly required to better
understand how the song-control system and special-
ized auditory regions such as CMM and NCM
coordinate song production and learning, song mem-
ories and song perception. These efforts will benefit
from comparative approaches that test whether
neural differences reflect behavioural differences
among taxa.
(b) Defining categories
Besides generating novel hypotheses, adaptive function
defines the categories of behaviour that we study.
Function defines fields. Indeed, physiological systems
are often named for what they do: circulatory system,
immune system, digestive system. Though not com-
monly thought of in this way, these fields reflect the
functional organization of physiology, shaped through
natural selection in response to the competition for
survival and reproduction. The function of the diges-
tive system, though sometimes considered in the
absence of evolution, is indeed an adaptive function.
Individuals better able to extract required energy and
nutrients from their food will outcompete those less
able to do so.
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In behaviour, considering adaptive function similarly
defines clusters of behaviour that are studied together:
communication, foraging, kin recognition. Moreover,
considering adaptive function can help resolve
categorization of behaviours in ways that may assist
understanding of mechanistic causes. For example,
maternal aggression in rodents is phenotypically similar
to other forms of aggression, but its endocrine regu-
lation involves changes in hormones associated with
pregnancy and maternal behaviour, such as oestrogen
and progesterone [59]. Thus, considering the function
of maternal behaviour can assist in the exploration of
mechanism. That function defines categories of behav-
iour that are studied together ismoreor less self-evident.
However, these categories can also guide the studies of
proximate mechanism. For example, pre-existing
neuroendocrine mechanisms can be co-opted through
evolution to control different behaviours with similar
function [60]. The gonadal steroids (e.g. testosterone,
oestradiol) that regulate gamete production later
evolved to control sexual behaviour. The peptide hor-
mone prolactin triggers brooding and crop milk
production in male ring doves (Streptopilia risoria;
[61]) and is associated with paternal behaviour in
California mice (Peromyscus californicus [62]). In this
case, the common adaptive function (paternal care)
may be underpinned by similar proximate mechanisms
(prolactin).
However, it is critical to also note that very different
mechanisms can give rise to similar outcomes. For
example, evolution can result in changes in the hor-
mone-dependent behaviours that may not be initially
predicted by ecological or evolutionary perspectives.
Testosterone may be critical for the expression of
sexual behaviour in one species, such as laboratory
rats [63], but not in another, such as red-sided
garter snakes (Thamnophis sirtalis [64]). Similarly,
work in evolutionary developmental biology has
shown gene expression underlying traits with the
same adaptive function may, or may not, be the
same. For example, eyes in mammals and insects
appear to have evolved independently, but their devel-
opment is influenced by the regulatory gene Pax6 in
both taxa [65]. Such deeply homologous traits that
have different morphology may develop through
expression of the same genes [66]. In this case, the
adaptive function (vision) may be implemented by
different non-homologous morphological structures
(eyes) in different taxa, that are, in turn, dependent
on developmental expression of (deeply) homologous
regulatory genes.
Adaptive function defines categories of behaviour.
The mechanisms within these categories may or may
not be similar across taxa. Thus, functional categories
may or may not reflect categories of mechanisms.
However, considering adaptive function provides a
useful framework to explore mechanisms within a cat-
egory to determine where they differ and where they
are the same.
(c) Setting criteria
Considering function can also set criteria that hypoth-
eses about proximate mechanisms must satisfy if they
are to have any explanatory power [35]. Part of the
reason for this involves design constraints [27]. The
number of shapes that can be used to create a useful
wheel are limited. Thus, hypotheses about how an
object can be moved using rollers are limited in
scope. Similarly, there are only so many ways that an
object can be spatially located by sound, or that the
earth’s magnetic field can be used for navigation
[35]. Hypotheses regarding the neural mechanisms
of sound localization by vertebrates must deal with
inter-aural time, intensity and phase differences.
These are the mechanistic bases by which the problem
can be solved. Hypotheses regarding the sensory and
neural mechanisms of magnetic compasses must deal
with polarity, strength and inclination of the earth’s
magnetic field. These are the kinds of information
that could theoretically be used by a magnetic com-
pass. It is the assumption that natural selection has
designed sensory systems with a function that allows
us to define the problems that neurosensory systems
must solve [35]. Thus, consideration of the adaptive
function of the system (e.g. sound localization) sets
criteria that any potential mechanistic hypotheses
must satisfy.
Although the adaptive function of behaviour sets
criteria that must be met, the discovery of proximate
mechanisms may take unexpected turns. Factors that
might be expected to be important based on design
criteria may turn out to not be. For example, the
regulation of seasonal reproduction must rely on
environmental cues that change seasonally which can
affect internal timing mechanisms. Photoperiod is
one such environmental cue, and it might be predicted
that declining day-length would act as a proximate
signal to terminate reproduction in spring/summer
breeders. However, in many species of songbirds, the
declining length of daylight in late summer has nothing
to do with the termination of seasonal reproduction.
Rather, exposure to long days in early spring, by mech-
anisms not fully understood, results in the eventual
onset of photorefractoriness and termination of repro-
duction [67,68]. Similarly, design considerations
constrain the types of cues that could be used by a
magnetic compass, and strong evidence indicated
early on that migratory birds use inclination [69].
However, the more recent discovery that crypto-
chromes may be the molecules that underlie birds’
light-dependent magnetic compass did not simply
result from consideration of function, and depended
on the input from physics theory [70]. Thus, consider-
ing adaptive function can set design criteria and
inform exploration of proximate mechanisms, but is
clearly not sufficient in and of itself for the discovery
of such mechanisms.
(d) Proximate–ultimate reciprocity
There is at least one other benefit of considering adap-
tive function when exploring proximate mechanisms.
This occurs when data on proximate mechanisms are
then used to refine and direct hypotheses at the ultimate
level of analysis. Such reciprocity between levels of
analysis can be the hallmark of the best integrative
biology. Here, I review several examples where
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consideration of mechanisms has guided the generation
of hypotheses regarding evolution and function.
Fluctuating asymmetry provides an example where
a proximate mechanism resulted in a large number
of functional hypotheses. Fluctuating asymmetries
are random deviations from perfect symmetry in bilat-
erally symmetric organisms, and individuals with
greater asymmetry are presumed to have lower ability
to cope with environmental stressors during develop-
ment (often referred to as developmental stability
[71]). Consideration of mechanisms of development
resulted in wide interest in behavioural ecology in the
functional significance of fluctuating asymmetry in
visual signals in a range of taxa [72,73]. In many
species, symmetric individuals are preferred mates
when compared with more asymmetric individuals
[74]. In turn, considering the function of preferences
for symmetry generated novel proximate hypotheses.
At the ultimate level, individuals may be selected to
prefer symmetrical mates because such mates may
pass on heritable traits that allow stable development.
Thus, perhaps symmetrical features are signals that
convey information about an individual’s develop-
mental stability to potential mates. This ultimate
hypothesis then begs the proximate question: can indi-
viduals perceptually detect fluctuating asymmetry? In a
series of studies, Swaddle [75] and Swaddle et al. [76]
have shown that the ability of birds to detect asymmetry
in visual features is limited. Birds can detect asymme-
tries in visual displays, but not the small differences
such as observed in asymmetrical morphological
traits. These new data on proximate mechanism must
now be accounted for and lead to the revision of ulti-
mate hypotheses. If asymmetry is not detected, how
can it be a signal? Perhaps asymmetry is correlated
with other traits that are detectable and do act as sig-
nals. Studies of fluctuating asymmetry have had their
share of methodological and theoretical challenges
[73,77]; however, the reciprocal flow of data and
interpretations have moved the field forward.
A second example of proximate and ultimate reci-
procity involves sex differences in song-control
regions of the songbird brain. Shortly after the discov-
ery of the song-control system, Nottebohm & Arnold
[49] found that brain regions such as HVC exhibited
one of the largest anatomical neural sex differences
observed in vertebrates. In zebra finches, females
cannot sing, and male HVC is an order of magnitude
larger than that in females. In canaries, however,
where females can sometimes sing (but less than
males), the sex difference was smaller. This proximate
observation led Brenowitz & Arnold [78] to test the
ultimate hypothesis that perhaps sex differences in
the brain co-evolved with sex differences in behaviour.
In a study of tropical wrens where males and females
sing equally, they found no sex differences in the size
of HVC. Since that time, the story has become more
complex, and the interplay between proximate mech-
anism and function and evolutionary history has
continued. In some species where females sing equal
to males, sex differences in HVC are still observed
[79–81]. However, comparative analyses do demon-
strate a correlation between sex differences in
behaviour and in the brain [82], but it is not a
simple correlation. Sex differences in HVC are
affected by phylogeny, and exhibit a persistent male
bias [83]. Indeed, a recent study of a species where
females sing more than males still found a male-
biased HVC size [84]. In another species, where
males and females have identical songs, males have a
larger HVC, but females’ HVC has much higher
expression of synapse-related genes [85]. Such studies
raise many further questions at both proximate and
ultimate levels. What was the ancestral condition;
have sex differences increased or decreased over evol-
utionary time? In species where females sing equally
to males, but have a smaller HVC, how do they accom-
plish this? Do they use alternative neural mechanisms
than males to learn and produce song? Do they incur
any developmental trade-offs by using such mechan-
isms? Understanding of the evolution of the sex
differences in the song-control system will require
better understanding of the development of these
differences. Although initially considered a model for
the organizational effects of gonadal steroids, currently
these sex differences are thought to emerge from sex
differences in the genome [86]. Further work is
required to determine both the evolution and mechan-
isms of sex differences in the song-control regions of
the brain, but this will be aided by consideration of
both ultimate and proximate levels of analysis.
Finally, studies of proximate mechanisms can influ-
ence studies at the ultimate level by highlighting
constraints that need consideration. Animals are not
infinitely flexible in their capacity to respond to the
environment. A recent review has called for a systematic
study of the evolution of mechanisms (‘evo-mecho’),
with a focus on simple mechanisms that work well in
diverse environments as opposed to complex mechan-
isms that work well in simple environments [31]. It is
unclear to what extent this call will be heeded, but it is
important to note that there is growing consensus that
studies of behaviour at the ultimate level of analysis
cannot ignore proximate mechanisms.
4. CONCLUSION
In this review, I have highlighted different uses of the
term levels of analysis, and explored the benefits of
using an integrative approach that uses an understand-
ing of adaptive function to guide exploration of
proximate mechanisms. This endeavour of integration
is not without risk, however. It is critical to thoroughly
evaluate whether or not two hypotheses are mutually
exclusive. By definition, hypotheses at the ultimate
and proximate levels of analysis are not mutually exclu-
sive, but it is often ignored that presumably competing
hypotheses within a level of analysis, or at different
levels of reductionism, may also be non-exclusive.
That is, two hypotheses may be non-exclusive even if
they are at exactly the same level of analysis and
level of reductionism. Much false debate could be
avoided by careful consideration of whether or not
alternative hypotheses are or are not mutually exclusive
alternatives.
Because ultimate and proximate levels do not
directly compete, however, does not mean they
should have nothing to do with each other. An
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adaptationist, integrative approach uses knowledge of
one level to guide research at the other. Explanations
at these two levels must at least be concordant, even
if they do not directly compete. Failure to consider
ultimate hypotheses when conducting research on
proximate mechanism can result in ‘greedy reduction-
ism’. Similarly, researchers at the ultimate level need to
be careful to not underestimate the complexities of
proximate mechanisms of the behaviours under their
study. Integrating across levels of analysis is tricky
business. Researchers often have primary expertise
and training in one level or the other. They must
thus tread carefully when in each other’s domain. A
common charge is that evolutionary ecologists have
too simple a view of proximate mechanisms, or that
cellular and molecular biologists have too simple a
view of behaviour and ecology. Indeed, I suspect that
many of the critiques of integrative approaches stem
from researchers in one field failing to address or
appreciate complexities in another. Integration across
levels of analysis thus requires detailed knowledge
of other research domains, and is thus often best
conducted via collaborations.
A complete understanding of behaviour, or any bio-
logical phenomenon, requires explanations of both
cause and function. Achieving these explanations is
best done in an integrative fashion. Consideration of
function can guide research into mechanisms in
many ways. Similarly, research into adaptive function
can be stimulated and guided by a detailed appreci-
ation of mechanisms. Although there is risk of
confusion, careful consideration of one level of analysis
can benefit research at the other.
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